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TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, CONSTITUTIONAL FLEXIBILITY, 
AND REGIME STABILITY 
MARK A. GRABER∗ 
The generation responsible for the Constitution of the United States be-
lieved that they were establishing a regime that would easily incorporate 
technological change.  By broadly defining national powers, the Framers en-
abled the national legislature to take advantage of the ways new technologies 
might advance national goals.  Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist Papers, 
No. 23 maintained that constitutional powers to secure the national defense, 
prevent internal disruption, regulate interstate and foreign commerce, and 
oversee relations with foreign nations: 
ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee 
or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the cor-
respondent extent and variety of the means which may be neces-
sary to satisfy them.  The circumstances that endanger the safety 
of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles 
can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is com-
mitted.1 
The Framers did not, for example, foresee the internet, but they adopted 
a set of national powers that enabled Congress to regulate online activities 
that threaten national security, risk internal subversion, affect interstate and 
foreign commerce, or influence foreign relations.  A constitution flexible 
enough to incorporate technological change would facilitate regime change.  
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 1.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland2 anticipated the logic 
of federal regulation of the internet and use of other new technologies when 
he pointed out: 
The subject is the execution of those great powers on which the 
welfare of a nation essentially depends.  It must have been the in-
tention of those who gave these powers, to insure, so far as human 
prudence could insure, their beneficial execution.  This could not 
be done by confiding the choice of means to such narrow limits as 
not to leave it in the power of congress to adopt any which might 
be appropriate, and which were conducive to the end.  This provi-
sion is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, 
and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human 
affairs.  To have prescribed the means by which government 
should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have been to 
change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the 
properties of a legal code.  It would have been an unwise attempt 
to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen 
at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided 
for as they occur.  To have declared, that the best means shall not 
be used, but those alone without which the power given would be 
nugatory, would have been to deprive the legislature of the capac-
ity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to ac-
commodate its legislation to circumstances.3 
The image of a “horseless carriage” captures how the Framers thought 
the Constitution would incorporate technological change.  The Framers were 
familiar with horse-drawn carriages.  The first federal law sustained by the 
United States Supreme Court was a federal tax on that technology.4  Horse-
less carriages were merely carriages that did not require horses to operate.  If 
a federal tax on horse-drawn carriages is constitutional, then a federal tax on 
horseless carriages—or the fuel used to operate a horseless carriage5—is con-
stitutional.  Horseless carriages are a lot faster than horse-drawn carriages, 
but both can be regulated as vehicles that are instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce and substantially affect interstate commerce.6  The rules for 
searching one are no different than the rules for searching the other.7 
                                                        
 2.  17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 3.  Id. at 415–16. 
 4.  See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 175 (1796). 
 5.  See Christopher D. Carlson, Public-Private Partnerships in State and Local Highway 
Transportation Projects, FED. LAW., Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 34, 35 (“State and federal fuel taxes [are] 
the primary source of funding for modern public highway transportation projects.”). 
 6.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (describing the types of activity 
Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause). 
 7.  See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (applying the same rules for auto-
motive searches as for searches of the vehicles that existed in the late eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries). 
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The horseless carriage may nevertheless subvert the tidy constitutional 
universe promised by Hamilton and Chief Justice Marshall.  Framers reared 
on horse-drawn carriages may not be able to grasp fully how horseless car-
riages operate or how they affect such matters as the national defense or in-
terstate commerce.  Horseless carriages helped obliterate what many consti-
tutional authorities in the early twentieth century believed to be core elements 
of constitutional doctrine, most notably the line between interstate and intra-
state commerce.  Pollutants from a tractor that never leaves a farm threaten 
global environmental catastrophe in ways horse manure never did.  The 
Framers were largely concerned with the impact of technological change on 
national powers.  Technological change may be more difficult to incorporate 
into a scheme of constitutional rights when rights are understood as trumps 
against national power.8  The same constitutional flexibility that enables gov-
erning officials to incorporate new technologies when exercising constitu-
tional powers may provide those officials with the means for overcoming 
rights limitations on government powers. 
The essays prepared for the 2019 Maryland Constitutional Law 
Schmooze provide a diversity of perspectives on constitutional capacity to 
incorporate technological change.  Professor William D. Blake challenges the 
framing confidence in constitutional capacity to incorporate technological 
change by pointing to the consequences of increasing judicial unfamiliarity 
with social science.9  The papers by Professor Jill I. Goldenziel and Manal 
Cheema and by Professor Henry L. Chambers, Jr. more optimistically sug-
gest how the Constitution can incorporate technological change when pre-
venting disinformation campaigns and regulating elections, respectively, in 
ways that enhance both government power and individual rights.10  Professor 
David Gray and Professor Carol Nackenoff detail how changes in surveil-
lance technology may undermine existing constitutional doctrine,11 with 
Gray being more confident than Nackenoff that such technologies may nev-
ertheless be made compatible with more enduring constitutional principles.  
Professor Frank Pasquale and Professor Leslie F. Goldstein explore constitu-
                                                        
 8.  See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977) (“Individual rights are po-
litical trumps held by individuals.”). 
 9.  William D. Blake, “Don’t Confuse Me with the Facts”: The Use and Misuse of Social 
Science on the United States Supreme Court, 79 Md. L. Rev. 216 (2019). 
 10.  Jill I. Goldenziel & Manal Cheema, Protecting First Amendment Rights in the Fight 
Against Disinformation: Lessons Learned from FISA, 79 MD. L. REV. 114 (2019); Henry L. Cham-
bers, Jr., Technological Change, Voting Rights, and Strict Scrutiny, 79 MD. L. REV. 191 (2019). 
 11.  David Gray, Collective Rights and the Fourth Amendment After Carpenter, 79 MD. L. REV. 
66 (2019); Carol Nackenoff, “Only the Beginning, Only Just the Start . . . Mostly I’m Silent”: New 
Constitutional Challenges with Data Collection Devices Brought into the Home, 79 MD. L. REV. 
88 (2019). 
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tional solutions to new technologies, bot speech and birth tourism, respec-
tively, that the Framers did not anticipate and their conceptual universes do 
not easily incorporate.12  Professor Julie Novkov highlights how automated 
systems undercut constitutional welfare rights by requiring beneficiaries to 
make claims using technologies they do not fully understand and instructions 
for determining eligibility for welfare benefits they do not fully grasp.13 
Professor William Blake highlights the most basic problem with incor-
porating technological change into constitutional decisionmaking: constitu-
tional decisionmakers who do not understand contemporary science may be 
inclined to invoke science only to buttress predetermined conclusions.  The 
Framers lived at a time when Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and Ben-
jamin Rush could simultaneously be among the leading scientific and politi-
cal thinkers of their period.  “Don’t Confuse Me with the Facts”: The Use 
and Misuse of Social Science on the United States Supreme Court details how 
more than two hundred years of scientific and political evolution have re-
sulted in species of scientific and political thinkers as different from each 
other as the Eloi and Morlocks of H.G. Wells’s The Time Machine.14  Blake 
points out, “[A]s quantitative social science becomes more methodologically 
rigorous, it becomes more likely that judges, who lack statistical training, 
may be unable to evaluate the research they cite.”15  This increasing judicial 
incapacity helps explain why science, that in theory should rise above ideol-
ogy, becomes just one more tool in the partisan wars that are wracking the 
United States and federal judiciary.  Blake’s careful analysis of judicial cita-
tions to social science finds, “The decision to cite science is one that polarizes 
Justices on the Court’s left and right.  Rather than letting scientific knowledge 
mitigate a Justice’s ideological proclivities, the date indicate Justices on both 
ends of the spectrum resort to scientific arguments to bolster their underlying 
worldviews.”16 
Professor Jill Goldenziel and Manal Cheema more optimistically pro-
vide a road map for reconciling technological change and constitutional prin-
ciple.  Their Protecting First Amendment Rights in the Fight Against Disin-
formation: Lessons Learned from FISA begins by acknowledging how the 
internet and social media threaten to undermine both fundamental individual 
rights and vital government powers.  Technological change threatens the 
worst of both worlds: a government with the power to curtail vital freedoms 
                                                        
 12.  Frank Pasquale, Six Horsemen of Irresponsibility, 79 MD. L. REV. 105 (2019); Leslie F. 
Goldstein, Technologies of Travel: “Birth Tourism,” and Birthright Citizenship, 79 MD. L. REV. 
177 (2019). 
 13.  Julie Novkov, Unclaming and Reblaming: Medicaid Work Requirements and the Trans-
formation of Health Care Access for the Working Poor, 79 MD. L. REV. 145 (2019). 
 14.  See H.G. WELLS, THE TIME MACHINE (SDE Classics 2018) (1895). 
 15.  Blake, supra note 9, at 230.  
 16.  Id. at 252. 
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but without the power to combat threats to national security.  Goldenziel and 
Cheema assert that “U.S. laws and jurisprudence protecting free speech do 
not reflect modern technological realities”17 and that those “laws do not allow 
the collection of . . . data that would adequately enable the government to 
assess the extent of [dis]information campaign and fight them.”18  Neverthe-
less, existing constitutional norms and doctrine do provide foundations for 
laws that will enable government officials to combat foreign disinformation 
campaigns while preserving constitutional rights.  National capacity to shut 
down foreign disinformation attempts can be advanced when rights holders 
are limited to American citizens.19  Individual rights can be maintained by 
disaggregating First and Fourth Amendment concerns.  In order to prevent 
Fourth Amendment violations, government “must obtain a court order or 
warrant” when seeking to surveil American citizens and “[p]robable cause 
must not be based solely on a proposed target’s First Amendment activi-
ties.”20  In order to prevent First Amendment violations, “the government 
should be required to put forward a compelling state interest that is narrowly 
tailored to surveil a particular individual.”21  The warrant requirement and 
strict scrutiny are longstanding features of constitutional doctrine.  Golden-
ziel and Cheema would simply apply them to governmental use of new tech-
nologies. 
Professor Henry Chambers provides as optimistic a Hamiltonian per-
spective on technological change and the Constitution.  Technological 
Change, Voting Rights, and Strict Scrutiny discusses how technology can 
simultaneously improve state capacity to regulate elections and remove bur-
dens that prevent many individuals from voting.  Consider common claims 
that states must close voter registration long before Election Day.  Technol-
ogy enables government to exercise power better while making registration 
easier.  “Election officials may have required several weeks to produce an 
accurate voter roll in years past,” Chambers notes, “but as states with same-
day registration suggest, with today’s technology, the time required to pro-
duce an accurate voter roll may be significantly shorter.”22  Given this tech-
nological win-win, Chambers insists that official failures to implement the 
relevant technology should be evaluated under the constitutional standards 
used when states deprive persons of the right to vote rather than the constitu-
tional standards used when states regulate elections in ways that merely bur-
                                                        
 17.  Goldenziel & Cheema, supra note 10, at 117. 
 18.  Id. at 118. 
 19.  Id. at 116. 
 20.  Id. at 141. 
 21.  Id. at 142. 
 22.  Chambers, supra note 10, at 203. 
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den many voters.  “When technology can make voting easier and more ac-
cessible,” he writes, “a state’s refusal to adopt such technology . . . should 
trigger increasingly strict constitutional scrutiny.”23  Existing constitutional 
doctrine, applied correctly, reconciles new technologies with inherited con-
stitutional values just as Marshall dreamed of in McCulloch.24 
Professor David Gray’s discussion of Carpenter v. United States25 finds 
existing doctrine more wanting then Goldenziel, Cheema, and Chambers, but 
maintains that new surveillance technologies can be reconciled with broader 
constitutional principles.  Building on his acclaimed The Fourth Amendment 
in an Age of Surveillance,26 Gray maintains, constitutional doctrine should 
recognize that Fourth Amendment rights belong to the people as a collective 
rather than to persons as individuals.  In his view, the Constitution “com-
mands that ‘the people’ shall live in a state free from fear of being the targets 
of unreasonable searches and seizures—and particularly searches and sei-
zures wielded as tools to punish disfavored political and religious groups.”27  
Technologies that enable government to see everything a person does in pub-
lic or shares with another person undermine the existing “public observation 
doctrine”28 because, as Gray points out, there is a constitutional difference 
between government use of technologies that only enable limited observation 
of some people in some places at some times and new technologies that ena-
ble government to surveil all people in all places at all times.  He notes that 
“[a] reasonable person does not expect anyone to monitor and retain a record 
of every time he drives his car, including his origin, route, destination, and 
each place he stops and how long he stays there,”29 or for that matter, every-
thing that person does in public or on a cell phone or the internet in private.  
For this reason, Gray is cheered by what he perceives as an emerging “tech-
nology-centered approach”30 to whether the use of new technologies require 
a warrant.  By discarding doctrines rooted in older technologies that provided 
government with only a limited opportunity to observe individuals and bas-
ing constitutional doctrine on the threat new technologies pose to basic pri-
vacy rights, constitutional decisionmakers will provide the same kind of se-
curity for constitutional rights in the twenty-first century that the Framers 
sought to provide in the eighteenth century.  Gray maintains, “affording law 
                                                        
 23.  Id. at 192. 
 24.  See supra text accompanying note 3. 
 25.  138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 26.  DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE (2017). 
 27.  Gray, supra note 11, at 82. 
 28.  See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (explaining how ordinarily a person 
in public “has no reasonable expectation of privacy”); Gray, supra note 11, at 68. 
 29.  Gray, supra note 11, at 70 (quoting United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562–63 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010)). 
 30.  Id. at 76. 
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enforcement broad discretion to search using [new technologies] would leave 
each of us and all of us—‘the people’—vulnerable to intrusive, pervasive, 
and indiscriminate surveillance—just the sort of insecurity posed by the gen-
eral warrants that inspired ratification of the Fourth Amendment in 1791.”31 
Professor Carol Nackenoff is less confident that inherited constitutional 
doctrines or principles will provide good answers for the surveillance prob-
lems presented by new technologies.  She begins from similar premises as 
Gray when noting, “Current definitions of privacy and assumptions about the 
right to privacy in the home are inadequate to deal with challenges posed by 
‘smart home’ devices.”32  She departs from Gray by worrying whether gen-
erational efforts to accommodate new technologies have created incentives 
for Americans to abandon the security concerns of the past.  Nackenoff fears 
that a generation raised on contemporary technologies may have very differ-
ent understandings of privacy than generations that, for example, could not 
and would not have transferred nude pictures of themselves over the internet.  
“If Americans share all sorts of information with friends and strangers, caring 
less about privacy than they used to (what is it with Jeff Bezos anyway?),” 
she declares, “is less privacy the twenty-first century’s ‘reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy?’”33  Nackenoff believes we have a better grasp of the relevant 
questions posed by technological advances, than the relevant answers, while 
suspecting, along with Gray, that privacy concerns are better resolved legis-
latively than judicially.  She concludes, “If the Supreme Court were to insist 
that only it, and not Congress, can define these constitutional values, Ameri-
can citizens, may be in for a great deal of trouble.”34  Her more optimistic 
view suggests that “in working to redefine [constitutional] values as technol-
ogy changes, citizens, activists, and legal scholars may be able to push toward 
a better resolution.”35 
Professor Frank Pasquale’s essay highlights how new technologies may 
subvert longstanding First Amendment doctrine, forcing Americans to make 
choices without powerful guidance from the Framers.  Much “speech” in the 
United States and elsewhere is now automated in ways likely to mislead lis-
teners into thinking they are hearing another human being.  Six Horsemen of 
Irresponsibility points out how “the advancing technology of ‘deepfakes,’ 
faces, voices, and other elements of human identity may be increasingly eas-
ily mimicked mechanically.”36  Such algorithmic speech scrambles tradi-
tional first amendment categories that assume human speakers and human 
                                                        
 31.  Id. at 80. 
 32.  Nackenoff, supra note 11, at 92. 
 33.  Id. at 98. 
 34.  Id. at 104 (footnote omitted). 
 35.  Id.; see also Gray, supra note 11, at 86. 
 36.  Pasquale, supra note 12, at 107. 
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audiences.  “[B]ot interventions,” Pasquale asserts, “are less speech than anti-
speech, calculated efforts to disrupt democratic will formation and fool the 
unwary.”37  This substitution of non-human programs for human rhetoric re-
quires constitutional decisionmakers to consider whether and when speech 
detached from human speakers warrants constitutional protection, a choice 
that could not even be conceived of by the persons responsible for the First 
Amendment.  Pasquale chooses human expression.  “Given growing concern 
about the extraordinary power of secret algorithmic manipulation to target 
influential messaging to persons with little to no appreciation of its ultimate 
source,” he concludes, “courts should not privilege algorithmic data pro-
cessing in these scenarios as speech worthy of the level of protection tradi-
tionally granted to political or even commercial speech.”38 
Professor Leslie Goldstein points out how birth tourism is another mat-
ter on which technological improvements are playing havoc with constitu-
tional norms.  Technologies of Travel, “Birth Tourism,” and Birthright Citi-
zenship details how advancements in transportation challenge framing 
understandings of citizenship.  The persons responsible for the Fourteenth 
Amendment were aware of women not legally in the United States who gave 
birth.  Reconstruction Republicans self-consciously chose to grant citizen-
ship to the children of such mothers.  They did so because they believed that 
persons residing in the United States had sufficient connection with that re-
gime to justify treating their children as members of that national community.  
Goldstein points out, “Allowing birthright citizenship to the children of bona 
fide residents—people who contribute to their communities and have plans 
to put down roots here, irrespectively of how they got here, fits within the 
broad umbrella of the Fourteenth Amendment.”39  The Framers could not, 
however, foresee the phenomenon of “birth tourism,” made possible by what 
Goldstein notes as “modern travel, advertising, and financing technologies 
not imaginable in the mid-nineteenth century.”40  Approximately 36,000 
pregnant women a year travel to the United States solely for the purpose of 
gaining U.S. citizenship for their children.41  Given their mother’s lack of any 
intention to establish domicile in the United States, Goldstein claims that 
such children should not be granted citizenship.  Just as Pasquale rejects a 
wooden textualism that would equate human speech, which the Framers fore-
saw, with bot speech, which the Framers could not have even conceived, so 
Goldstein rejects a wooden formalism that would equate the children of per-
sons illegally attempting to establish residence in the United States, a matter 
                                                        
 37.  Id. at 107–08. 
 38.  Id. at 108. 
 39.  Goldstein, supra note 12, at 189. 
 40.  Id. at 177. 
 41.  Id. at 182. 
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the Framers explicitly addressed when writing the citizenship clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, with the children of persons in the United States 
solely to give birth, a matter the Framers never considered.  Goldstein asserts, 
“there is no good reason to give U.S. citizenship to the offspring of anyone 
wealthy enough to purchase a maternity vacation in the United States but who 
has no interest in living here as a member of the community.”42 
Professor Julie Novkov is the least sanguine of the authors in the Sym-
posium on the successful integration of technological change and constitu-
tional principle.  One of her concerns is that historically disadvantaged per-
sons, who tend to have less education and technological skills, may not be 
able to operate new technologies successfully to the detriment of their con-
stitutional and legal rights.  Unclaiming and Reblaming: Medicaid Work Re-
quirements and the Transformation of Health Care Access for the Working 
Poor points out that many poor people have been denied welfare benefits 
because they have been unable to input vital information into the computer-
ized systems increasing responsible for determining eligibility.  Medicaid is 
designed to provide benefits for poor persons with health problems, but such 
persons are far more likely than healthy affluent persons to have problems 
operating automatic systems for claiming benefits.  Novkov writes, “common 
themes across their experiences were preexisting poor health, marginal work 
records that, for many, intertwined with their health struggles, and difficulty 
in understanding and using the electronic system for reporting [the] work 
hours” necessary to obtain financial assistance.43  These problems with tech-
nology raise questions about “the amount of aggravation, delay, frustration, 
and error we can rightfully expect people to endure to gain access to statuto-
rily granted benefits.”44  As, if not more, important, Novkov points out, com-
puterized systems eliminate human discretion that in the past often enabled 
persons to obtain welfare benefits when the circumstances of their lives, 
while clearly entitling them to benefits, did not fall into the specific narrow 
categories mandated by law.  When human beings determined eligibility for 
welfare, “public benefit recipients learned to work within the system, often 
with the help of sympathetic caseworkers would could reformulate their 
messy narratives into claims that circumvented or short-circuited problematic 
results.”45  Technology undercuts such cases, as Goldberg v. Kelly46 recog-
nized, by forcing persons entitled by law to statutory benefits to rely without 
much assistance when making claims on unfamiliar technologies and legal 
categories. 
                                                        
 42.  Id. at 190. 
 43.  Novkov, supra note 13, at 158. 
 44.  Id. at 171. 
 45.  Id. at 173. 
 46.  379 U.S. 254 (1970). 
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Historians insist “the past is a foreign country”47 for reasons that directly 
and indirectly implicate technological evolution.  The past is a different coun-
try in part because late eighteenth century and mid-nineteenth century con-
stitutional thinkers did not foresee contemporary technology when making 
constitutional rules and principles.  They did not think about the internet, 
birth tourism, or of cell phone technology.  The past is a different country in 
part because late eighteenth century and mid-nineteenth century constitu-
tional thinkers did not have the same conceptual tools to describe technolog-
ical change as their turn of the twenty-first century descendants.  Their vo-
cabulary could not capture “virtual reality” or the “surveillance state.”48 The 
past is a different country in part because new technologies fuel new concep-
tual tools.  Our notions of privacy are evolving in part because contemporary 
technologies that affect privacy are evolving. 
The technological and conceptual gulf between past and present raises 
fundamental questions about the nature of constitutional decisionmaking im-
plementing a constitution designed “to endure for ages to come.”49  Consti-
tutional decisionmakers may have the simple task of applying inherited con-
stitutional rules to new technologies.  Constitutional decisionmakers 
maintaining constitutional stability in light of technological change may have 
to engage in the more difficult task of updating existing constitutional rules 
in light of broader constitutional principles.  Alternatively, new technologies 
may require constitutional decisionmakers to make choices the Framers did 
not foresee and would not have understood.  These choices may require 
Americans to abandon some strands of their constitutional tradition in order 
to maintain others or to develop new constitutional traditions with the hope 
that those reforms will survive the next wave of technological development. 
                                                        
 47.  For the origin of this quotation, see L.P. HARTLEY, THE GO BETWEEN 17 (1953). 
 48.  See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From 
Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (2006). 
 49.  See supra text accompanying note 3. 
